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COGNITIVE SIMPLIFICATION PROCESSES
IN STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING: INSIGHTS FROM
BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Strategic decision-making can be viewed as a special kind of decision-
making under uncertainty. Such decision-making involves the activities of
goal formulation, problem identification, alternatives generation, and
evaluation/selection. Researchers in cognitive psychology and behavioral
decision theory have identified a number of cognitive simplification
processes which may effect the way decision-makers to perform these tasks.
Within this paper, the research on these processes is summarized and their
possible effects on strategic decision-making are discussed. Implications
for future research in this area are also drawn.
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INTRODUCTION
Those responsible for formulating an organization's strategy face
a task of extreme complexity and ambiguity. Though the complexity of
the task way appear almost infinite, human information processing
capacity is limited. Writers in the field of strategic management
generally recognize that human cognitive limitations may affect stra-
tegic decision-making (Steiner and Miner, 1977: 226-231), basing their
arguments en Simon's (1976) notion of "bounded rationality." However,
they have not discussed the specific effects of bounded rationality on
decision-maker's perceptions or behavior.
Cognitive psychologists and behavioral decision theorists, on the
other hand, have identified a wide range of cognitive processes which
serve to simplify decisionmaker's perceptions of problems. Their
research provides the basis for tentative propositions about the ways
strategic decision-makers process information and how bounded rational-
ity affects decision outcomes at each stage of the strategic decision-
making process.
Characteristics of Strategic Decision-Making
One of the central features of strategic decisions is their lack of
structure (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret, 1976). Mintzberg et al.
state that the strategic decision process is characterized by novelty,
complexity, and openendedness. Decision-makers usually begin with little
comprehension of the situation and their understanding deepens as they
work on the problem (1976: 265). Mason and Mitroff (1981: 10-13) observe
that the lack of structure in strategic decision-making is due to the
complexity of strategic problems. They state that strategic problems
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have no clear formulation and that it is extremely difficult to describe
the problem and to determine the criteria by which solutions should be
judged. Complex problems involve uncertainty and ambiguity for decision-
makers.
Michaels suggests that when environmental uncertainty cannot be
minimized by organizational action, managers may alter their perceptions
of the environment so that it appears more certain. This happens because
the psychological state of uncertainty regarding an important decision
is very painful. Hence, decision-makers may repress awareness of the
uncertainty and act on a simplified model of reality which they construct
(Michaels, (1973: 31)). In order to be able to act at all in such environ-
ments, decision-makers may use perceptual processes to simplify the
decision situation.
This paper develops conjectures about simplification processes in
strategic decision-making by drawing on literature in the fields of
cognitive psychology and behavioral decision theory dealing with problem
formulation and decision-making under uncertainty. Researchers in these
fields often call these processes biases. However, others prefer the
term "heuristics" since the term "biases" suggests that these processes
generally have a negative impact on strategic decisions. Tversky and
Kahneman (1974), Winkler and Murphy (1973), and other behavioral decision
theorists have pointed out that they may actually improve decisions. As
Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1125) state, "In general, these heuristics
are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors."
The purpose of discussing the possible operation of these processes in
strategic decision-making is not to criticize the quality of most strategic
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decision-making but rather to generate ideas about the ways decision-
makers actually deal with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty.
COGNITIVE SIMPLIFICATION PROCESSES IN STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING
Extensive lists of cognitive simplification processes have already
been developed and examples can be found in reviews by Hogarth (1980);
Hogarth and Makridakis (1981); Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein (1977);
Taylor (1975); and Tversky and Kahneman (1974). From these reviews, a
small set of simplification processes has been selected for discussion in
the context of strategic decision-making. The discussion is restricted
to those processes which have been demonstrated in laboratory settings
and for which possible examples could be found in field settings. Some
of these field examples have been identified by the researchers who
discuss the simplication processes. Others have been identified by the
author from public descriptions of business decisions.
The use of both laboratory and field support is considered necessary
because it has been suggested that neither laboratory nor field evidence
alone is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of these processes in
strategic decision-making. There are those who argue that we cannot draw
inferences about executives' performance at real world decision-making
from students and laboratory decision-making tasks (Ungson, Braunstein,
& Hall, 1981). They hold that extensive experience with a variety of
complex decisions produces high-quality decision-making performances in
executives which is relatively free from bias. In support of this claim,
evidence suggests that some groups of professional decision-makers such
as weather forecasters make good use of statistical information in
forecasting and do not exhibit a high degree of decisional bias (Hogarth,
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1975: 277-278) . However, these decision-makers are able to learn from
their mistakes and improve their performance over time because they are
required to make numerous predictions based on clearly identified data
and receive continuous unambiguous feedback soon after they make their
predictions (Hogarth, 1975: 278; Nisbett & Ross, 1980: 265).
It could be argued that none of these conditions hold in strategic
decision-making. Strategic decisions occur relatively infrequently and
involve ambiguous data and possible disagreement about which data are
relevant. Further, the feedback about the success of the strategy is
often ambiguous since there may be multiple evaluation criteria, and
evaluation data may not be available for years after implementation.
However, the suspicion of laboratory results is appropriate. Laboratory
experiments merely demonstrate the existence of individual simplifica-
tion processes which may not operate in organizational contexts. In the
conclusion of this paper, group characteristics which should increase the
impact of individual biases on organizational decisions are discussed.
Others criticize the attempt to document simplification processes
through the use of data on acutal organizational decisions collected after
the decisions have been made. This data is typically collected through
interviews with key decision-makers and examination of organizational
documents and records related to the decision. As Kinder and Weiss state,
"such documents may reveal more about the politics of the decision setting
than about individual decision processes" (1978: 726-727).
The focus on simplification processes for which laboratory and
field support exists should increase the chance of identifying cognitive
processes which really do affect organizational decisions rather than
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processes produced only by the artificiality of the laboratory context
or the political processes in organizations. The laboratory and field
evidence is not offered as proof that these simplification processes
exist but rather as a basis for selecting processes which have some
probability of effecting decision-making. These are then used as a
basis for generating propositions about the ways in which cognitive
simplification may affect strategic decision-making. These are listed
later in the "Propositions" section of the paper.
Simplification Processes and the Stages of Strategic Decision-Making
Numerous descriptive models of the strategic decision-making process
have been developed (see Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret 1976; Glueck
1976; Mazzolini, 1981; and Hofer & Schendel, 1978 for examples). These
models involve various numbers of stages and are generally similar to
earlier models of the organizational decision-making process (Lang,
Dittrich, & White, 1978). In Table 1, four normative models are presented
and a simplified model is derived which will provide the basis for the
following discussion.
Insert Table 1 about here
As can be seen from Table 1, all of these models contain the activities
of problem identification, alternatives generation, and evaluation/
selection while some of them include implementation as a fourth activity.
In this section, selected cognitive simplification processes have
been classified according to the strategic decision-making stage they may
affect. Table 2 represents the three fundamental activities or stages in
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the strategy formulation process and the cognitive processes which may
operate during these three stages.
Insert Table 2 about here
Goal Formulation/Problem Identification
The importance of problem identification and goal formulation in
strategic decision-making has recently been discussed by Lyles (1981),
Lyles and Mitroff (1980), and Schwenk and Thomas (1982). In an early
paper on organizational problem formulation, Pounds suggested that
problem formulation begins with the recognition of gaps between
expectations or standards and performance. From his observations of
numerous decision processes, he determined that these standards may be
based on past trends, projected trends, standards in other organizations,
expectations of others, and theoretical models (Pounds, 1969).
Mintzberg et al. (1976) suggest that problem identification in
strategic decision-making consists of two activities. The first is
recognition
,
similar to Pounds' problem identification, and the second
is diagnosis
,
where further information is collected to define the problem
and its causes. During the recognition routine, problems or gaps must
be identified in streams of ambiguous data from the environment. The
authors suggest that the threshold or the point at which stimuli are
interpreted as indicating a problem varies from manager to manager and
within the same manager from one time to another. Diagnosis involves
decisions about which type of information to collect in order to begin
the process of problem solving (1976: 253).
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In normative strategic decision-making models, the major purpose
of information gathering in the beginning of the process is to identify
gaps between objectives and performance. However, such gaps may indicate
either random fluctuations or changes requiring revisions in strategy.
Decision-makers' expectations may determine how such gaps are interpreted
or even whether information on such gaps will be accepted and used. The
following have been identified as cognitive processes which may affect
problem identification: prior hypothesis bias, adjustment and anchor-
ing, escalating commitment, and reasoning by analogy (see Table 2).
Prior Hypothesis Bias . Researchers have identified a simplification
process which may lead decision-makers to ignore or misinterpret information,
Levine (1971), Pruitt (1961) and Wason (1960) showed that individuals who
formed erroneous beliefs or hypotheses about the relationship between
variables tended to make decisions on the basis of these beliefs despite
abundant evidence over numerous trials that they were wrong. Further,
they sought and used information consistent with these hypotheses rather
than disconfirming information. Kozielecki (1981: 241-242) , in a series
of laboratory experiments, showed that decision-makers overestimate the
value of information which confirms their hypotheses and undervalue
disconf irming information. Jervis (1976: 143-181) has also provided nu-
merous examples from international relations of decision-makers' tendency
to accept information which conforms to existing expectations and beliefs.
Under the effects of this process, decision-makers who believe that
the company's current strategy is successful may ignore information
suggesting gaps between performance and expectation. Conversely, those
who believe it is failing may overweight information on such gaps.
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Adjustm.ent and Anchoring * Tversky and Kahneman (1974) discuss another
process which may lead decision-makers to deny gaps. They call this the
anchoring process. In strategic decision-making individuals must often
make initial judgements about values of variables critical in particular
decisions and revise these judgements as new data comes in. However, the
adjustments are typically insufficient. Final estimates of values are
biased toward the initial values. 'Individuals involved in the ongoing
process of strategy formulation may attend to negative Information about
the success of present strategy but they may not make full use of it in
revising their predictions of company performance under the present strat-
egy. Under the influence of the anchoring process, their revisions may be
smaller than are justified by the new information.
This process may be illustrated through the decision by the manage-
ment of the Convair Company to continue development and production of
their 880 aircraft in the late 1950' s and early 1960's. Initial forecasts
of sales and profits for the aircraft were very optimistic while it was in
the design and testing stage. However, subsequent events which seemed to
suggest a need to revise these forecasts (such as the failure of potential
buyers to follow through on earlier purchase commitments) were not heeded
(Smith, 1963: 63-96). Indeed, in a report to stockholders in the early
part of 1960, a top company executive followed a report on huge cost over-
runs with the statement "we have every reason to believe [the 880 program]
will be one of our most successful ventures" (Smith, 1963: 88).
Escalating Commitment . If the gap is recognized, some research
suggests that decision-makers may deny its significance. That is, they
may define the problem indicated by the gap as a minor one which does
-11-
not require a change in strategy. Researchers have found that once
an individual commits significant resources to an investment project,
he will tend to allocate more to the project if he receives feedback
indicating that the project is failing than if he receives feedback
indicating that it is succeeding. The feeling of personal responsi-
bility for the project apparently induces decision-makers to remain
with their chosen project in spite of evidence that it is not paying
off (Staw, 1981). Fox and Staw (1979) found that escalating commitment
was most likely to occur when decision-makers were vulnerable to job
loss and when there was strong organizational resistance to the chosen
course of action.
An excellent review of the laboratory experiments on escalating
commitment is found in Staw (1981) . In these experiments it is cbvious
that the decision-makers perceive the discrepancy indicating a project's
failure since they allocate more money to projects which appeared to be
failing. However, they do not use this perceived discrepancy to alert
them to the need to change their strategy. Rather, they seemed to
interpret the negative feedback as a signal that they should commit
more funds to save the project.
Staw argues that the decisions of various American presidential
administrations on successive escalations of the level of conflict in
the Vietnam War represent the best examples of decisions influenced by
this process. He suggests that once the United States committed large
numbers of U.S. troops and heavy casualties were sustained, a process
of escalating commitment was started which was very difficult to reverse
(Staw, 1981: 577).
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Duhaime (1981) also found some evidence for this bias in recent
divestment decisions by a number of Fortune 500 firms. In some cases,
unprofitable divisions with steadily mounting losses were held for years
by the parent company and were divested only after the top level execu-
tive responsible for their acquisition had left the company.
Other research indicates a possible hypothesis which decision-makers
may adopt to explain a perceived discrepancy in such a way that it appears
to require no change in strategy. They may explain it as a result of
chance factors rather than a result of a flaw in initial strategy. If
they adopt this interpretation, they are likely to persist in the current
course of action and escalate commitment to it. Staw and Ross (1978)
found that subjects committed significantly more funds to a failing
project when they believed the reason for the failure was extrinsic (a
chance event which could not have been foreseen) than when the reason
was seen to be intrinsic.
Reasoning by Analogy . Decision-makers may admit that the gap does
exist and that it indicates a need to change current strategy. If this
happens, there is at least one process which may help to determine the
manner in which the problem will be defined. Steinbruner (1974) identified
this process in his review of decision research in cognitive psychology
and called it reasoning by analogy. Reasoning by analogy involves the
application of simple analogies and images to guide problem definition.
In strategic decision-making, it typically involves the application of
analogies from simpler situations to complex strategic problems. This
process helps to reduce the uncertainty perceived in the environment.
Reasoning by analogy has been shown to be effective in generating
creative solutions to problems (Gordon, 1961; Huff, 1980). However in
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strategic decisions, which involve a great deal of uncertainty and com-
plexity, the use of simple analogies may mislead the decision-makers into
an overly simplistic view of the situation (Steinbruner, 1974: 115).
When decision-makers use analogies to define problems, they may
not recognize that there are critical differences between their analogies
and the decision situations they face. That is, they may not objectively
evaluate the extent to which their analogy is representative of their
decision situation. The representativeness heuristic has been discussed
by Tversky and Kahneman and will be covered in mere detail in a later
section of this paper. Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1126) have cited
a number of laboratory experiments in which representativeness influ-
enced decision-makers' use of diagnostic information in making predic-
tions. This same heuristic may operate in the use of analogies to
define problems.
Images and analogies are very common in discussions of top level
problems in businesses and government. In international relations, the
image of falling dominoes helped shape American policy toward Southeast
Asia (Steinbruner, 1974: 116). Business organizations and their problems
are often defined using analogies to sports teams and well (or poorly)
oiled machines.
In the early 1970' s, the management of General Cinema was consid-
ering entering (through acquisition) another line of business in addi-
tion to their theater and soft-drink bottling operations. The acquisi-
tion candidate was seen by management in terms of the analogy of "the
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third leg of a stool" supporting the company's high rates of return.
This image or analogy suggested to company management that they enter
a line of business not closely related to General Cinema's current
businesses and influenced the type of acquisition candidates considered.
They eventually entered an agreement with a furniture retailer to finance
the development of a national chain of showrooms. This venture appeared
more and more questionable as the retailer suffered increasing losses in
the mid-1970 's and was finally abandoned (Uyterhoeven, 1976).
Alternatives Generation
After the strategic problem has been defined, strategic alternatives
must be generated for dealing with the problem. Mintzberg et al. suggest
that solutions to strategic problems may either be found or developed.
Initially, decision makers may search their memories or search actively
within their organization for solutions. If search is not successful, so-
lutions must be designed. The authors state that because of time pressures
and expense only a single alternative is typically designed (Mintzberg et
al., 1976: 255-256). Mazzolini confirms the insights of Mintzberg et al.
and states that search for alternative solutions is constrained by rou-
tines, guidelines, and standard operating procedures such that only a
single alternative typically emerges (Mazzolini, 1981: 89).
Based on an intensive study of several organizational decisions,
Alexander (1979) concluded that too much closure during the problem
definition phase may be the result of rigidly predetermined goals or
prematurely specific diagnosis which may inhibit the emergence of poten-
tially good alternatives. According to Alexander, a common feature of
the decision processes he studied was "the rapid convergence of options,
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both in number and in range, before the formal evaluation process ever
began" (1979: 396). Further, creative alternatives tended to be among
those eliminated. This elimination was based on "intuitively perceived
and non-formalized constraints (which are applied) before any of the
alternatives were elaborated to any extent which would enable formal
evaluation of their prospective impacts or outcomes" (1979: 397). In
some cases cognitive biases lead to a situation in which there is n°_
search for alternatives; in which decision-makers focus on a single
alternative and vigorously defend it as the only possible course of
action.
Since the simplification processes discussed in this section tend
to eliminate the search for alternatives, they could be considered in
the evaluation stage. However, since alternatives generation is part of
most normative models, these processes are discussed in terms of their
limiting effects on alternatives generation. They include: single
outcome calculation, inferences of impossibility, denying value trade-
offs, and problem set (see Table 2).
Single Outcome Calculation . Steinbruner (1974) elaborates on Cyert
and March's (1963) concept of problemistic search and applies it to in-
dividuals as well as organizations in his discussion of the process of
single outcome calculations. Rather than attempting to specify all
relevant values and goals and generate a number of alternative courses
of action as normative decision theory would suggest, decision-makers
under the effects of this process may focus on a single one of their
goals or values and a single alternative course of action for achieving
it.
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Steinbruner draws on the work of Festinger (1957) who conducted a
series of laboratory experiments demonstrating the process of bolstering
or developing arguments to magnify the attractiveness of a desired alter-
native in order to increase the "spread" of desirability between it and
non-preferred alternatives. Janis and Mann (1977: 82-85) also discuss
a number of more recent studies on the bolstering process.
Steinbruner argues that, contrary to normative models of organiza-
tional decision-making, uncertainty is often not resolved by probabilistic
calculations of the outcomes of alternatives. Rather, favorable outcomes
are inferred for preferred alternatives while unfavorable outcomes are
projected for non-preferred alternatives. Thus strategic decision-making
involves a single-valued problem and a single preferred alternative to
which the decision-maker is committed from the outset of the decision
process (1974: 122-123). This is an extremely powerful simplification
process and is probably more likely to occur in highly complex and
uncertain decision environments.
Inferences of Impossibility . Steinbruner suggests that decision-
makers deal with non-preferred alternatives through inferences of impos-
sibility. In contrast to the suggestions from normative decision theory,
Steinbruner points out that decision-makers may devote a good deal of
effort to identifying the negative aspects of non-preferred alternatives
and attempting to convince themselves that they are not possible to
implement (1974: 119). Since this forces premature rejection of alter-
natives, it may lead to a premature closure at the possible cost of
rejecting the most feasible alternative.
Denying Value Tradeoffs . As both Steinbruner and Jervis have pointed
out, decision-makers tend to over-value their favored alternative by denying
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value tradeoffs (Steinbruner, 1974: 62-65; Jervis, 1976: 128-136). That
is, they attempt to interpret facts in such a way that the favored alter-
native appears to serve several values simultaneously and appears to have
no costs associated with it. They attempt to deny that there are trade-
offs and that there are some values which may not be served by their
favored alternative.
Numerous examples of the operation of these three processes in
international relations are given by Steinbruner. A business example
is provided by Dowei in his description of Ford Motor Company, which
lobbied (successfully) for eight years against Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard 301 which would have required them to redesign the gas
tank of the Pinto. Ford's cost-benefit analysis showed that the redesign
would not be profitable. Here, the cost-benefit analysis involved a
single value or goal (profits) and Ford executives apparently considered
only a single way of reaching that goal once it was challenged by poten-
tial legislation. This consisted of lobbying efforts against the proposed
legislation (Dowei, 1977). Though there is no way to tell whether this
single outcome calculation was supported by inferences of impossibility
or the denial of value tradeoffs, the basic facts of the case suggest
that decision-makers concentrated on a single outcome which indicates
a high probability that these supporting biases came into play also.
Problem Set . Problem set is another decisional process which has
been dealt with in laboratory research in cognitive psychology (Anderson
& Johnson, 1966; Newell & Simon, 1972). Problem set is demonstrated when
repeated use of one problem-solving strategy makes it more difficult to
develop alternative strategies (Anderson & Johnson, 1966: 851).
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Though this bias has only been experimentally demonstrated using rel-
atively simple problem-solving tasks, a similar process may be operating
when strategic decision-makers become strongly committed to a set of as-
sumptions about the nature of their business and appropriate solutions to
its problems. Mason and Mitroff (1981) have identified this rigidity of
assumptions as a persistent problem in corporate strategy formulation.
They provide detailed descriptions of business decisions in which strat-
egies had been developed within the framework unexamined organizational
assumptions. Through the application of techniques Mason and Mitroff
had developed for questioning these assumptions and revising them where
necessary, the decision-makers were able to improve the quality of their
decision-making and the plans they produced.
Evaluation and Selection
From the preceeding discussion it can be seen that the three activ-
ities of goal formulation/problem identification, alternatives genera-
tion, and evaluation/selection cannot be seen as distinct and unrelated
parts of the strategic decision-making process. The previously cited
research suggests that these activities are mutually dependent. The
process of strategic decision-making is iterative and cyclical and errors
at one "phase" may either be magnified or corrected by this cycling
process. In seme cases, the decision has essentially been made by the
time it reaches the alternatives evaluation phase. Alternatives have
been narrowed to a single one which is merely confirmed at this stage.
Alexander suggested that when multiple alternatives are evaluated,
"easily applied criteria without cumbersome data needs or complex
judgemental demands get more weight" (1979: 398). Mintzberg et al.
-19-
make a similar point in their discussion of the screening of strategic
alternatives (1976: 257).
If on the other hand, several alternative strategies are generated,
these must be evaluated and the best alternative selected. The following
discussion deals with cognitive processes which may affect the activities
of evaluation and selection. These include: representativeness, the
illusion of control, and devaluation of partially described alternatives.
Representativeness . Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have pointed cut a
cognitive process they call the representativeness bias which may lead
to simplistic predictions of the consequences alternatives. It causes a
decision-maker to overestimate the extent to which a situation or sample
is representative of the situation or population to which he wishes to
generalize. This process may be responsible for the fact that decision-
makers tend to view strategic decisions in terms of simple analogies.
It also causes them to overestimate the extent to which the past is
representative of the present and the extent to which solutions offered
for problems in the past will be of value in the present problem.
Part of this representativeness bias involves insensitivity to pre-
dictability. In making predictions of the effects of various courses
of action decision-makers do not take into account the extent to which
the evidence for the predictions is reliable, or the extent to which
the criterion is related to the cues which they use to predict it
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1125).
Decision-makers are also insensitive to sample size in making pre-
dictions. Though information about a large number of of past strategies
would be necessary in order to make generalizations about the requirements
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for a successful strategy, strategic dec is ion-makers are often unable to
collect data on a large number of past strategies and must generalize from
a small data base. In this case, they tend to have too much confidence in
their predictions from small amounts of data, feeling that these data are
representative of the population as a whole. Tversky and Kahneman call
this a belief in "law of small numbers" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974: 1125).
Nisbett and Ross (1980: 55-59) have suggested that decision-makers are
especially susceptible to the law of small numbers when considering one
or a few very vividly described cases. A single vivid description of a
new venture's failure in a particular industry may influence the decision
about entering the industry more than volumes of statistical data indi-
cating high success rates in the industry.
Finally, in decision-making tasks which involve high levels of un-
certainty, decision-makers should be aware of this uncertainty and of
their inability to accurately forecast events in the decision environ-
ment. Their lack of ability to forecast outcomes should make them wary
of becoming overcommitted to particular courses of action and should
encourage them to develop contingency plans. However, decision-makers
tend to be overly confident in their ability to predict outcomes (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974: 1129) which may perpetuate the illusion that their
predictions are valid. Thus, they may not recognize the need to develop
formal contingency plans. Einhorn and Hogarth (1978) call this over-
confidence the illusion of validity.
Seawell Avery, as head of Montgomery Ward, believed that there
would be a depression at the end of World War II. The basis for this
belief was the fact that there had been such a depression after World
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War I. His belief was so strong that it influenced his decision not to
allow Ward to expand to meet competition from Sears. This decision lead
to a permanent loss of market share to Sears (Hartley, 1976: 8-9). This
may be an example of the operation of this process of judgment by repre-
sentativeness.
Another possible example is DuPont's attempt to develop and market
Corofam from 1963 to 1971. Management's overconf idence in forecasts of
technical and marketing expenses (which were about half of the actual costs)
formed the basis of a very costly venture which BuPont had to abandon in
April 1971 at a substantial loss. Overconfidence in forecasts may be the
most common manifestation of this process (Hartley, 1976: 71-79).
Illusion of Control . This process, studied by Lef court (1973), Langer
(1975), Langer and Roth (1975), and Larwood and Whit taker (1977) may also
affect decision-makers' perceptions of the need for contingency plans.
They may overestimate the extent to which the outcomes of a strategy are
under their personal control and may assume that through additional effort
they can make their strategy succeed should problems arise. Langer (1975)
reported on six studies which showed that subjects making a variety of
decisions expressed an expectancy of personal success higher than the
objective probability would warrant. They tended to overestimate their
skill or the impact it would have on the outcome.
Larwood and Whittaker (1977) comparing management students' and
executives' performance on a marketing problem found further evidence for
the illusion of control. The management students tended to overestimate
their abilities and the performance of the hypothetical firm of which
they were sales managers. Managers also overestimated performance in
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this exercise but showed less tendency to do this if they had experienced
unsatisfactory results in earlier planning experiences.
The effects of this process on evaluation of alternatives may have
been responsible for the Heublein company's ill-fated decision to acquire
the Theo. Hamm company in the mid 1960's. One of the central questions
in the acquisition decision was whether or not Heublein executives had
the marketing expertise to reverse Harm's market share decline. Heublein
executives' overestimation of their expertise in this area and the appli-
cability of their expertise to Hamm resulted in the decision to acquire
the company which later had to be sold at a substantial loss (Hofer, 1972).
Devaluation of Partially Described Alternatives . Finally, Yates,
Jagacinski, and Faber (1978) demonstrated a preference for complete in-
formation which may affect decision-makers' evaluation of alternatives.
Among a group of strategic alternatives, it is likely that the probable
consequences of some of the alternatives will be more completely described
than others. Yates, et al. found that decision makers tend to devalue
the alternative that is partially described. Since partially described
alternatives involve uncertainty for decision-makers, they tend to nega-
tively evaluate these against alternatives which are better described
and therefore, resolve more uncertainties.
According to John DeLorean, corporate level executives at General
Motors exhibited this bias when they demanded inordinate documentation
on proposals for projects before accepting them. Because of these demands,
DeLorean 's K-Car proposal was not accepted as more thoroughly documented
proposals might have been. Each time the K-Car proposal was presented to
corporate-level management, they made new demands for more information on
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it. They finally shelved the proposed project in late 1970. The result,
according to DeLorean, was that GM was unable to supply the light, fuel-
efficient cars American consumers demanded after the oil embargo in 1973
(Wright, 1979: 216-218).
PROPOSITIONS
In selecting this relatively small number of simplification pro-
cesses from the lengthy list of those identified in the behavioral deci-
sion theory and cognitive psychology literatures, an attempt was made to
focus on those for which laboratory and field evidence exists. However,
as was discussed earlier in the paper, there are problems in using both
of these types of data to support the existence of these processes. For
this reason, no claim can be made that they have been proven to exist in
strategic decision-making.
However, research in cognitive psychology and behavorial decision
theory may provide a framework for understanding strategic decision-making
in complex environments and for developing propositions about the ways
decision-makers may simplify the decision task. The laboratory results
and examples from the field provide the basis for the following set of
propositions regarding the effects of cognitive simplification processes
at each stage of the strategic decision-making process. It is not as-
sumed that these processes will affect all strategic decisions. In the
conclusion of this paper, some of the conditions under which strategic
decisions will be affected by the processes are specified. However, the
propositions specify the way these processes may affect strategic deci-
sions if decision-makers fall prey to them.
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Goal Formulation/Problem Identification
1) Decision-makers under the influence of the prior hypothesis and
adjustment and anchoring processes will tend to perceive fewer gaps than
their data indicate (Levine, 1971; Pruitt, 1961; Wason, 1960; Jervis,
1976; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kozielecki, 1981).
2) Decision-makers under the influence of the escalating commitment
process will minimize the significance of gaps and will tend not to make
full use of these gaps as a basis for strategy revision (Staw, 1981;
Staw & Ross, 1978; Fox & Staw, 1979; Duhaime, 1981).
3) If the significance of a gap is recognized, decision-makers who
reason by analogy will tend to define the problem causing the gap through
an analogy to a simpler situation (Steinbruner, 1974; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974).
Strategic Alternatives Generation
4) In searching for a solution to a strategic problem, decision-makers
using single outcome calculation and bolstering will tend to generate a
single alternative rather than several alternatives (Steinbruner, 1974;
Festinger, 1957; Janis & Mann, 1977).
5) Decision-makers who deny value tradeoffs and use inferences of
impossibility will tend to deal with non-preferred alternatives by denying
that they serve any values better than the preferred alternative and by
overestimating the difficulty in implementing them (Steinbruner, 1974;
Jervis, 1976; Dowei, 1977).
6) Under the effects of unchallenged assumptions and problem sets,
decision-makers who attempt to generate more than one alternative will
-25-
tend to generate very few (Anderson & Johnson, 1966; Newell & Simon, 1972;
Mason & Mitroff, 1981).
Evaluation and Selection
7) Decision-makers under the influence of the representativeness
heuristic will tend to over-estimate the accuracy of their predictions
of the consequences of alternatives (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Nisbett
& Ross, 1980; Hartley, 1976).
8) Decision-makers under the influence of the illusion of control
will tend to overestimate the importance of their own actions in assuring
the success of strategic alternatives (Langer, 1975; Langer & Roth, 1975;
Lefcourt, 1973; Larwood & Whittaker, 1977; Hofer, 1972).
9) Decision-makers will exhibit a preference for alternatives
described in greater detail, even though partially described alterna-
tives may score higher on the decision-maker f s evaluation criteria
(Yates et al., 1978; Wright, 1979).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, research on selected cognitive simplification processes
has been summarized and conjectures regarding the possible effects of these
biases on strategic decision-making have been developed. Of course these
processes should not be regarded as universally harmful in organizations.
Indeed, they may be functional in the extreme complexity of strategic
decisions. Simplification processes during the goal formulation/problem
identification stage may help to provide stability in organizational
strategy by ensuring that strategies are pursued consistently over time.
Single outcome calculation and the related processes may be necessary when
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there is only one politically viable strategy. Simplification during the
evaluation phase may increase the changes of successful implementation by
increasing decision makers' confidence in a strategy and their commitment
to it.
Effects of Group and Organizational Processes
As was mentioned earlier in the paper, cognitive simplification
processes may not operate in all strategic decisions. Descriptions of
top level public and private sector decisions provide examples of sit-
uations in which these processes did not lead to low quality decisions.
In these situations, what Janis and Mann call vigilant information pro-
cessing occurred and a number of alternatives were evaluated with some
objectivity.
Quinn (1980) described well-managed companies in which environmental
opportunities or threats were met by attempts to a) extend the range of
alternative strategies considered (Xerox), b) broaden the information
base available (Exxon) and c) build up active search routines for new
alternatives (1980: 19-20). He also illustrated, with examples from
Xerox and General Mills, how top management often "consciously created
discussion forums and allowed slack time for their organizations to talk
through threatening issues, work out the implications of new solutions,
or gain an improved information base that would permit new options to
be evaluated objectively in comparison with more familiar alternatives"
(1980: 114).
Allison (1971) summarized the effective and objective decision-
making of the Kennedy administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
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A variety of responses to the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, from
"doing nothing" to "a surprise military invasion of Cuba" were actively
debated by advisors like George Bundy, Robert Kennedy, and Theodore
Sorensen and considered by President Kennedy (1971: 185-187).
It is not possible at this stage in the research on simplification
processes to specify the conditions under which each will or will not
operate in organizational decisions. However, some general observations
can be offered regarding group and organizational factors which may
intensify the effects of these processes.
The basic assumption of this paper, which is supported by a
number of writers on this subject, is that simplification processes
are most likely to impact organizational decisions when there is a great
deal of of consensus within the decision-making group. If all members of
the decision-making group are in fundamental agreement with each other,
or if the highest-ranking member of the group is able to enforce consensus
around his or her basic assumptions, it is very unlikely that assumptions
about the problem formed through these simplification processes will be
challenged. Janis (1972) and Janis and Mann (1977) describe some of the
problems produced by this type of consensus in their discussion of the
phenomenon of Groupthink
.
A high level of consensus may also develop if a decision-making group
divides into two or more sub-groups, each cohesive within itself but with
opposing preferences. Each subgroup may tend to use organizational data
selectively to support its preferences in a debate and/or bargaining
process in which assumptions are typically not closely or objectively
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examined. Mason and Mitroff (1981) and Steinbruner (1974) discuss the
potential problems arising from this type of debate or bargaining process.
However, if there is a divergence of assumptions among group members,
if assumptions are held with some tentativeness, and if they are examined
critically in the decision-making process, these simplification processes
are more likely to be corrected. Assumptions underlying expert reports
may be challenged and thus the effect of the simplification processes
would be reduced (Mason & Mitroff, 1981; Nisbett & Ross, 1980).
Future Research
As was mentioned earlier in the paper, only a small group of simpli-
fication processes from earlier research have been identified in this
paper for discussion in the context of strategic management. The summary
articles listed in the introduction of this paper contain many additional
"cognitive biases" which might have an impact on strategic decisions but
which were not included in this review because examples of their operation
in the field were not identified by the author. However, even among the
processes selected for inclusion in the paper the support is somewhat vari-
able. Only a single laboratory experiment and a single business strategy
case was identified in support of one of the processes. For others, mul-
tiple laboratory experiments and field examples were identified.
Table 3 summarizes the simplification processes and the type of sup-
port identified for each. An asterisk has been placed beside the cognitive
processes which seem to have the strongest support and, therefore, may
hold the most promise for future research.
Insert Table 3 about here
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Future research in this subject might involve the attempt to identi-
fy the effects of some of these cognitive processes on strategic decision-
making and thereby to increase the interface between the fields of cognitive
psychology, behavioral decision theory, and strategic decision-making.
Future research of this type should take two directions. First,
since many of the simplification processes have been examined exclusive-
ly in laboratory research, an attempt should be made to document their
existence and effects in field settings. Researchers may be able to
identify the processes in executives' detailed descriptions of their
own problem solving efforts such as those collected by Mintzberg, et
al. (1976). Field observation of decision processes may also provide
insights into the effects of these processes and the conditions under
which they will operate in strategic decisions.
A second approach would involve further laboratory research investi-
gating the effects of these processes using tasks more representative of
the ill-structured problems encountered in strategic decision-making.
Such concurrent laboratory and field research has been advocated in the
most fruitful approach to research for several questions in strategic
management (Schwenk, 1982).
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TABLE 3
Support for Che Simplification Processes
Process
1) Prior Hypothesis Bias
2) Adjustment and Anchoring
3) Escalating Commitment*
4) Reasoning by Analogy*
5) Single Outcome Calculation,*
Inferences of Impossibility,
Denying Value Tradeoffs
5) Problem Set*
7) Representativeness
8) Illusion of Control
9) Devaluation of Partially
Described Alternatives
Support
1) Multiple laboratory experiments,
multiple anecdotal examples from
international relations.
2) Multiple laboratory experiments,
single anecdotal example from
business strategy.
3) Multiple laboratory experiments,
multiple anecdotal examples from
business strategy.
4) Multiple laboratory experiments
on related processes, multiple
anecdotal examples from interna-
tional relations, single example
from business strategy.
5) Multiple laboratory experiments
on related processes, multiple
anecdotal examples from interna-
tional relations, single example
from business strategy.
6) Multiple laboratory experiments,
multiple anecdotal examples from
business strategy.
7) Multiple laboratory experiments,
two anecdotal examples from
business strategy.
8) Multiple laboratory experiments,
single anecdotal example from
business strategy.
9) Single laboratory experiment,
single anecdotal example from
business strategy.
*Especially promising for future research.
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